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MORE LIGHT ON THE ABROGATION OF THE
ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

T

HE FOLLOWING article which attempts to interpret the
British and Australasian attitudes toward the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its modification or abrogation on the
expiration date of July 13, 1921, broadens and modifies con
siderably the previously accepted view of J. Bartlet Brebner, as
expounded in the March 1935 issue of the P olitical Science
Q uarterly , that the Canadian prime minister, Arthur Meighen,
led the campaign for the abrogation of the agreement, that he
urged an international conference on Pacific affairs, and that
thereby the Dominion of Canada formulated a policy for the
British Empire.
Resumé of the Alliance and Its Operation to 1921
On January 30, 1902, Great Britain abandoned her splendid
isolation and entered into an alliance with Japan. While both
Powers pledged themselves to uphold the independence and
territorial integrity of China and Korea and to secure equal
opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry
of all nations, Japan recognized the special interests of Great
Britain in China, and Britain recognized those of Japan, political
as well as industrial, in China and Korea. The treaty, which
was to remain in force for at least five years,1 was directed against
a mutual enemy—Russia. The alliance was popular in both
nations. Japan welcomed the prestige it afforded her; the treaty
was “a sort of ticket of admission to the great international
game.”2 England prized the Japanese commitment as security
against Russia—if she should threaten British interests in China
or India—or against Germany and Russia in the event those two
Powers should turn on France in Europe and involve Great
Britain.3 The alliance was reframed during the Russo-Japanese
i G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the
Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London, 1927), voi. Il, ch. xi, final text, pp.
115-120. Hereafter cited as British Documents.
2 Alfred L. P. Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Berkeley, 1923), p. 65.
3 Taraknath Das, Foreign Policy in the Far East (New York and Toronto,
1926), pp. 259, 261, quoting extracts from a memorandum of Sir Francis
Bertie of the British Foreign Office, F. O. China 1501, March 11, 1901.
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peace negotiations and, as renewed for ten years, on August 12,
1905, included India in its scope.4
At the beginning of World War I, Sir Edward Grey, hoping
to keep Japan out of Shantung and the Pacific islands, attempted
to limit her belligerent actions to a naval campaign against Ger
man armed vessels in the China Seas, and to the protection of
Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific;5 but strategic require
ments, military necessity, and Japan’s eagerness to extend her
field of operations to Shantung and to islands in the Pacific pro
vented the foreign secretary from achieving his aim.6
Throughout the war Japan proved a faithful and efficient ally.
Her navy patrolled Australian waters and the Indian Ocean.
Great Britain’s fleet, having to guard the North Sea, the Atlantic,
and, to a large extent, the Mediterranean, “was strained to the
very last ship, new and old.’’ It was impossible for that fleet,
immense as it was, to guarantee safe passage for Pacific dominion
forces. A real test for the alliance arose. Japanese battle cruisers
convoyed or escorted 500,000 to 600,000 ANZAC forces and
1,000,000 Indian troops for protection against German cruisers
still raiding the Pacific and Indian Oceans.7 By a secret AngloJapanese accord of 1915 Great Britain recognized her ally’s claim
to the Marianas, Caroline, and Marshall Islands. At the height
of the German submarine campaign of 1917 the British govern
ment approached Japan for a destroyer flotilla for operations
in the Mediterranean. Japan agreed for a price, the compensa
tion being pledges in a secret exchange of notes by which not
only Great Britain but France, Italy and Russia engaged them
selves to “support Japan’s claims in regard to the disposal of
Germany’s rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands
north of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference.”
At the same time the British understood that the Japanese
4 For official material concerning the renewal of the alliance, see British
Documents, IV, 120-183. Text of agreement, pp. 128-113.
6 Memorandum of the British Chargé d’Affaires Barclay to the Secretary of
State, Aug. 18, 1914, U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1914, Supplement, The World War, p. 171.
6 For Japan’s entrance into the war and her stated reasons, see Charles N.
Spink, “Japan in the World War”, Pacific Historical Review, vol. V (Dec.
1936), pp. 297-311.
7 Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. CXLVI.
col. 1710, Lloyd George speaking.
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government would “treat in the same spirit Great Britain’s
claims to the German islands south of the equator.“8
Japan emerged from the war in a position of entrenched
hegemony in the Orient. With Germany eliminated and Russia
demoted to a second place in the Far East, Japan took possession
of all the former’s holdings in Shantung as well as her islands
north of the equator, gained predominant influence in Man
churia, and became more aggressive than either of her prede
cessors. The destruction of Tsarist Russia left Japan supreme
on the shores of the Sea of Japan and in the waters of the North
Pacific. The “Island Empire of the Pacific’’ was now one of the
world’s great Powers. British assistance was no longer needed
for guaranteeing its integrity. Japan’s danger was from mili
tarism at home rather than from any combination of predatory
nations.
At the Peace Conference in Paris, Australia’s attitude toward
Japan was a curious compound of apprehension and conciliation.
Prime Minister William Hughes led the opposition to the Japa
nese request for a recognition of racial equality, fearing that it
was a veiled demand for a revision of immigration legislation.
He disapproved of Japan’s mandate over the former German
islands in the North Pacific, and ardently advocated Australia’s
claims, recognition of which would have required the invalida
tion of the 1915 and 1917 British agreements with Japan.
The political and territorial changes produced by the war
altered the power balance and alignments. After the collapse of
imperial Russia and Germany, Great Britain no longer needed
help from Japan in maintaining the integrity of her empire.
The threats to its stability were internal rather than external.
In all the world there was but one Power—the United States—
which could challenge Britain to combat with the remotest pos
sibility of success. But war between these two English-speaking
nations was unthinkable, considered outside the realm of possi
bility. Therefore, neither Japan nor Britain needed the pro
tection of an alliance for defensive purposes. The Anglo-Japanese
Treaty no longer served a vital British interest, yet the agreement
threatened amicable relations not only between the United
Kingdom and the United States but between the mother country
and the Dominion of Canada which was in accord with the
8 John V. A. MacMurray, comp, and ed., Treaties and Agreements with and
Concerning China, 1894-1919 (New York, 1921), II, 1168.
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United States attitude toward Japan. Moreover, the League of
Nations as an instrument for the maintenance of peace was
intended to supplant alliances and secret diplomacy as means
of ensuring security. Consequently, Britain persuaded Japan to
make a joint statement to the League of Nations concerning the
treaty. On July 8, 1920, Foreign Minister Curzon and the Japa
nese Ambassador in London, Baron Chinda, signed and com
municated to Geneva a note to the effect that their governments
had come to “the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement
of July 13th, 1911 . . . though in harmony with the spirit of the
Covenant of the League of Nations,” was “not entirely consistent
with the letter of that Covenant.” They accordingly informed
the League that they recognized “the principle that if the said
agreement be continued after July, 1921, it must be in a form
not inconsistent with the Covenant.”9
Dominion Views of the Alliance
Australia, New Zealand and Canada were directly concerned
over the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The tendency
in Australasia was to regard the treaty as a protection against
Japanese expansion in the South Pacific; even Japan understood
that the agreement would not stand the stress of a vigorous
immigration policy directed toward that area. Such an attempt
by her would threaten to drive Australia and New Zealand, and
perhaps even Canada, away from Great Britain as a partner of
Japan. On the other hand, neither Australia nor New Zealand
was anxious to contribute heavily to the maintenance of a mili
tary and naval force sufficient to protect her completely against
a possible Japanese advance. True, a successful war by Japan
against the United States would deal a serious blow to the safety
of the Pacific dominions, but to antagonize Japan would be to
expose Australasia to the revival of the immigration question
and would thus make imperative large expenditures for the
military and naval defense of the “White Australia” program.
Consequently, the better policy from the point of view of these
two dominions was, on the one hand, to support the renewal of
the alliance in such fashion as to avoid friction with the United
States, and, on the other hand, to prevent the race question from
rising in an awkward or provocative way. Thus the renewed
0 Bell to Secretary of State, July 26, 1920, USDS, Foreign Relations, 1920,
II, 685-686.
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treaty might become a sort of insurance or guarantee against war
in the Pacific. If it were not renewed, the Pacific dominions
would ask those responsible for its abrogation what guarantee
could be offered as a substitute for the alliance.10
Prime Minister William Hughes of Australia favored the con
tinuance of the alliance with such modifications as would make
it acceptable to Great Britain, to the United States and to his
country. After World War I, the Commonwealth, resentful of
'‘White Australia's’" dependence on Japan, had welcomed Presi
dent Woodrow Wilson’s naval program as a balance-of-power
device in the Pacific. When the post-war fall in commodity prices
nearly ruined Australia, at the same time that Britain’s economic
distress afforded no relief from the depression and indebtedness,
and the Singapore naval base did not materialize, Australia felt
that she could not depend on Great Britain to win in a naval
race in the Pacific. Only two potential allies were available, the
United States and Japan. Remembering how the Japanese gov
ernment had aided the empire’s cause during the war, and aware
of the withdrawal of the United States from participation in
plans for world security, the Pacific Commonwealth elected to
stand by the alliance.
The reason for Australia’s action was certainly not a desire to
assist Japanese expansion in the Pacific, but the sure knowledge
that the treaty was her safeguard if or when Japan and the
United States sprang at each other’s throats. Otherwise, the first
rush of the Oriental onset, taking the Philippines and Guam in
its stride, would fall on Australia. The United States was far
away and American battleships, for strategic reasons, would be
almost powerless to help at the beginning.
Hughes outlined his policy and enunciated Australia’s position
regarding the alliance in a speech delivered in the House of
Representatives on April 7, 1921, which contained the following:
What is the hope of the world? As I see it, it is an alliance, an
understanding, call it what you will, between the two great branches
of the English-speaking peoples. Now here is our dilemma. Our
interest lies in a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Yet that
Treaty is anathema to the Americans. We read almost every day of
disturbing rumors of great navies, the world longing for peace re
sounds with the clanging of hammers, nations fervently building
more and more war ships, and there is rivalry openly expressed
between those two great nations, the United States of America and
io Cf. Dennis, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
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Japan. America has said she must have the greatest navy in the
world; that she must have a navy sufficiently strong to defend her
self. To defend herself against whom? She has left the world in no
doubt, or in very little, as to whom on this point. All these things
concern and disturb us greatly. For we not only have no quarrel
with America, but we have no quarrel with Japan. We have our
ideals; Japan has hers. There is room in the world for both of us.
We want to live on terms of amity with all the nations of the earth.
. . . I am in favour of renewing the Treaty in any form that is
satisfactory to Britain, America, and ourselves.11

In an interview with a Times correspondent on May 25, 1921,
Premier William F. Massey of New Zealand said:

As to the Japanese Treaty, so long as we insist on, and maintain,
our right to choose our fellow-citizens in this country we have much
to gain, and nothing to lose by the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese
Treaty. The Japanese were perfectly loyal to us during the war.
When we were sending away our main body of the Expeditionary
Force the presence of the big Japanese cruiser with the British
cruiser made their going, as far as the sea voyage was concerned,
perfectly safe. We owe them a debt of gratitude, and it is well to
remember this fact, and to endeavour to repay them when oppor
tunity offers.

The prime minister’s view was that

. . . so far at least as New Zealand is concerned, the old dread
of yellow immigration, though still as real and deep-seated as ever,
is for the present rather latent than active. Though the proposed
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance raises issues of the profoundest possible concern to Australasia, it can not be said that the people
of New Zealand are at all seriously exercised about it. . . . New
Zealand has no objection whatever to the renewal of the Japanese
treaty in its present form, nor is she in the least excited by the
alleged endeavours of Japan to remove the bar against Asiatic immi
gration into Australasia. And the reason is that she is fully satisfied
that they will not succeed.12

The position of the dominion had been ably and succinctly
stated by her high commissioner, Sir James Allen, in a single
sentence: “New Zealand has no quarrel with or fear of Japan,
and views the Treaty as an ample safeguard of her good faith.”13
11 Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Represenatives, vol. XCIV,
p. 7267. Cf. ibid., vol. CXVII, p. 11635; The Times (London), Supplement,
Empire Number, May 24, 1921.
12 The Times, May 27, 1921.
13 Ibid.
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The press of Canada generally came out against renewal, the
outstanding exception to general disapproval of the treaty being
the Montreal Star, an ultraconservative paper.14 British Colum
bia, a province facing the Pacific, was inclined to favor renewal
of the alliance if Canada specifically retained control of immi
gration. As early as December 28, 1920, the Toronto Globe
expressed its opposition to the treaty. An editorial of that date
emphasized that neither Japan nor Britain needed the protec
tion of an alliance for defensive purposes. That should be suffi
cient reason for ending it. Under the circumstances the Globe
believed
the interests of world-peace would be advanced by the cancellation
of the alliance between Britain and Japan. There could be no doubt
then as to the intention of the Britannic peoples throughout the
world to preserve absolute neutrality in the remote but possible event
of the friction between Japan and the United States leading eventu
ally to hostilities. Canada assuredly—treaty or no treaty—would feel
under no obligation to come to the help of Japan against the United
States and so open her own borders to invasion and to all the horrors
of modern war. The statesmen of the British Empire who are
engaged in the work of safeguarding Britain’s interest in the Far
East doubtless understand that Canada can be no party to any
international agreement which involves even remotely a risk so
great.15

The Alliance and the Conference of Prime Ministers, 1921
In June 1921, an Imperial Conference of all the prime min
isters of the British Empire convened in London. Of the three
principal topics discussed therein—foreign policy, imperial de
fense, and the Anglo-Japanese Treaty—the commitments under
the alliance were considered the most pressing by Canada, Aus
tralia and New Zealand. The ministers were concerned with
evolving a policy of peace for the Pacific. The discussion of
tranquillity and security in that ocean centered on the alliance
and a limitation of naval armaments in the area. The conference
had been forewarned that the treaty would come to an end on
July 13, 1921, on the ground that the Anglo-Japanese memo
randum of July 8, 1920, addressed to the League of Nations,
14 J. Bartlet Brebner, “Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Wash
ington Conference", P olitical Science Q uarterly, vol. L (March 1935),
pp. 49-50.
is Toronto Globe, Dec. 28, 1920.
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concerning the alliance’s incompatibility with the League Cove
nant amounted to a denunciation. The three months’ extension
requested by the British government was intended to afford the
conference an opportunity of considering the question of re
newal; but the assumption on June 20, the first day of the
conference, was that in three weeks the alliance would expire if
the prime ministers did not arrange for its renewal.16
The notification was regarded by British legal experts as con
stituting a denunciation of the treaty as provided in clause 6,
which stipulated that twelve months’ notice should be given for
termination. The question before the conference when it turned
to the discussion of the treaty was whether it should be renewed
in a form consistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations
or be allowed to lapse.
In his opening speech before the conference, Prime Minister
David Lloyd George referred briefly “to one of the most urgent
and important of foreign questions—the relations of the Empire
with the United States and Japan,” and asserted:
there is no quarter of the world where we desire more greatly to
maintain peace and fair play for all nations and to avoid a competi
tion of armaments than in the Pacific and in the Far East. Our
Alliance with Japan has been a valuable factor in that direction in
the past. We have found Japan a faithful Ally, who rendered us
valuable assistance in an hour of serious and very critical need. . . .
We desire to preserve that well-tried friendship which has stood us
both in good stead, and to apply it to the solution of all questions
in the Far East, where Japan has special interests, and where we
ourselves, like the United States, desire equal opportunities and the
open door.17

The British cabinet, including Foreign Secretary Curzon, Colo
nial Secretary Winston Churchill, and Arthur J. Balfour, repre
sentative for League of Nations Affairs, publicly favored renewal
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
In the second meeting of the conference, June 21, Prime
Minister Hughes delivered his first speech, in which he took
occasion to set forth the attitude of Australia toward the Anglo16 Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. XCVII,
p. 11635. Cf. The Times, July 26, 1921, p. 10.
ir Great Britain, House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1921, vol. XIV, Cmd.
1474, Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United
Kingdom, the Dominions and India held in June, July and August, 1921,
p. 13. Hereafter cited as Conference of Prime Ministers.
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Japanese Alliance. He pointed out, ‘‘we have not a clean slate
before us. If we had to consider for the first time whether we
should have a treaty with Japan, the position might be very
different. We have not.” The treaty, though modified, had been
in existence for many years. It could not be renewed precisely
in its present form, for it must conform to the requirements of
the League of Nations. ‘‘But the case for renewal is very strong,
if not indeed overwhelming. To Australia . . . this treaty with
Japan has special significance.” Hughes continued:

Speaking broadly, we are in favour of its renewal. But there are
certain difficulties which must be faced. One of these arises out of
the attitude of America towards this Treaty. I am sure I state the
opinion of Australia when I say the people have a very warm comer
in their hearts for America. They see in America today what they
themselves hope to be in the future. We have a country very similar
in extent and resources, and it may be laid down as a sine qua non
that any future Treaty with Japan, to be satisfactory to Australia,
must specifically exclude the possibility of a war with the United
States of America. It ought to do this specifically, but if not spe
cifically then by implication so clear and unmistakable that he who
runs may read. It is perfectly true that the present Treaty does this
by implication, but not so plainly as to preclude misinterpretation.
In any future Treaty we must guard against even the suspicion of
hostility or unfriendliness to the United States.18

The Australian prime minister suggested a conference to in
clude the United States and Japan.19 He indicated that disarma
ment was related to the renewal or nonrenewal of the AngloJapanese Treaty, but stated,

in any case we must have such naval defense as is necessary for our
security. The War and the Panama Canal have shifted the world’s
stage from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic to the Pacific. The
stage upon which the great world drama is to be played in the
future is in the Pacific. The American Navy is now in those waters.
Peace in the Pacific means peace for this Empire and for the world.20

William Massey considered the Anglo-Japanese Treaty as one
of the most important subjects on the agenda of the conference.
With whatever modifications might be necessary, he was quite
prepared to support its renewal. In saying this he was guided by
Japan’s cooperation during the war, when the Pacific and Indian
Oceans were not safe, and at a time when there were twenty-eight
is Ibid., p. 19.
is Ibid., p. 20.
20 Ibid., p. 21.
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or more Australian and New Zealand ships in the latter ocean
carrying twenty-eight thousand troops. Massey observed:
But supposing Japan had been on the enemy side, one result
would have been quite certain, that neither Australia nor New
Zealand would have been able to send troops to the front, neither
could we have sent food or equipment—equipment for the soldiers
and sailors or food for the civil population of Britain. It would not
have been possible. These things have all to be remembered in
connexion with the renewal of the Treaty. I am prepared to take
the American view into consideration. I do not want to leave any
wrong impression on that point.21

The prime minister, however, made clear that his support of
the Anglo-Japanese Treaty did “not in the very slightest affect
the fact that in New Zealand we stand by our right to choose our
future fellow-citizens/’22
Thus Massey’s views were similar to those of Hughes, his alter
ego, with whom he generally agreed. But behind the scenes
before the conference convened, Sir John Findlay, a distinguished
New Zealander who, with Sir John Ward, had represented the
dominion at the Imperial Conference of 1911 and had again
returned to London on February 6, 1921, took a radically differ
ent position. The visitor had made a special study of the prob
lems of imperial policy in the Pacific Ocean and was experienced
in framing the legislation of the young country. During the
premiership of Richard Seddon there was scarcely an important
act placed on the statute books which was not drafted by Findlay,
who, though not a member of the government, was treated by
Mr. Seddon as an unofficial counselor. After the premier’s death,
Sir John was not only appointed attorney general and minister
of justice, but was also made leader of the Legislative Council,
or upper chamber of the New Zealand legislature. According to
the Times:
Whether in or out of office, Sir John Findlay, the leading K. C.
in the Dominion, has been the deus ex machina whose intervention
has often turned the course of events into new channels, sometimes
with far reaching consequences not oidy for New Zealand, but for the
Empire. He it was, for instance, who inspired the dramatic offer
of a Dreadnought from the Dominion to the Imperial Government
in 1912, at the time of the trouble with Germany over the Agadir
incident in Morocco.23
2i Ibid., p. 31.
23 The Times, Feb. 7, 1921.

22

Ibid.
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Findlay remained true to form in London. In an article of
February 10, 1921, which was in reality an interview, he was
reported to have asserted that
New Zealand and Australia, while appreciating Japan’s assistance
in the war, have resolved to remain white men’s countries. They
had prepared plans for a big scheme, firstly of Imperial, and secondly
of European immigration, barring Germans and Russians. The
scheme will presently be launched. They object emphatically to a
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, which is unjustified, since
the German and Russian menaces have been removed, and America
is ready to make common cause in the event of a Japanese peril.
The question must be properly thrashed out at the coming Imperial
Conference.24

Thus William Massey and Sir John Findlay were in open
disagreement over the alliance before the conference assembled.
The premier in his May 26 interview stated that neither the
original nor the amended statements made by Findlay on Febru
ary 10 and 24 on the subject of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty “really
fit the facts.“25
According to an article in the October 6, 1921 issue of the
Daily Express,26 Findlay came to London to acquaint the British
government with the position of the New Zealand people. The
attorney general informed the writer of the article that just prior
to the Imperial Conference “the feeling in New Zealand was so
strong against the Anglo-Japanese treaty that unless England
showed herself as determined to resist all Japanese demands, the
people of New Zealand were in favor of separating themselves
from the British Empire and asking the United States to assume
a protectorate.” He added: “This will not be printed in the
British newspapers and it will not be liked by the British gov
ernment, but that is the way we feel.”27
However, the prime ministers of Australia and Canada respec24 Wellington Evening Post, Feb. 25, 1921.
25 The Times, May 27, 1921.
26 The Daily Express, London, owing to Lord Beaverbrook’s close personal
relations with Lloyd George, might be credited with having access to some
authentic information on important political proceedings.
27 Enclosure in confidential letter of N. C. Twining, naval attaché to the
American Embassy in London, to the Secretary of the Navy, Oct. 12, 1921,
Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library, RG 45,
Office of Naval Intelligence File, Register no. 14865-A, Subject File 1911-1927,
OY Limitation of Armament Conference, declassified Feb. 1948, Navy Dept.,
Archives of the United States. Hereafter cited as Naval Intelligence File.
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tively led the fight in the conference for and against the retention
of the alliance. On June 29 the Canadian minister expressed
his government’s opposition to the renewal of the treaty in any
form on the grounds that the reason for its existence had expired,
that such entanglements were incompatible with the League of
Nations’ principles, and that both the United States and China
regarded the alliance with mistrust as implying benevolent neu
trality toward Japanese aggression. The preceding February
Arthur Meighen had urged Lloyd George to invite the United
States, Japan, China, and the empire to a conference on Pacific
affairs to settle outstanding issues. Canada feared her own in
volvement in an American-Japanese conflict which was contrary
to the basic principle of her foreign policy—maintenance of the
best possible relations between Great Britain and the United
States. Therefore Meighen resisted the renewal of the alliance
for he feared it threatened amicable Anglo-American and Canadian-American relations, upon both of which Canada depended
for her security. He reminded the delegates that good AngloAmerican relations were the cornerstone of British policy and
the hope of the world.28 The Canadian people half-consciously
shared their minister’s feelings, and a majority of the press be
lieved he expressed the opinion of his countrymen.29
William Hughes’s retort to Meighen that “The British Empire
must have a reliable friend in the Pacific” set off a series of sharp
exchanges. Lloyd George sensing the fervor of the two ministers
and their unyielding positions calmed the tense atmosphere by
declaring that the July 8, 1920 joint Anglo-Japanese note to the
League of Nations did not constitute a valid denunciation of the
treaty, which, therefore, would continue in force until it was
really denounced. This was the prediction that had been made
28 Brebner, loc. cit., pp. 53-54.
29 Cf. The Times, May 24, 1921, Supplement, Empire Number, p. vi,
“Canada and the U. S. A.—Ideals in Common”. New York Times, Nov. 9,
1921, p. 13, Nov. 11, p. 12. However, in a letter to the editor of the New
York Times, signed “Canuck”, Trochu, Alberta, Dec. 8, 1921, the view was
expressed that Meighen did not speak for Canada nor have a mandate from
the Canadian people to act on their behalf, that he not only played to the
gallery and to the United States in denouncing the treaty, but also created
a false impression abroad to the effect that the dominions were so slightly
joined to the mother country that anything advocated by them which ran
counter to England’s wishes would result in their breaking away altogether
and setting themselves up as independent states on the idea of self-deter
mination of small nations. New York Times, Dec. 25, 1921, VII, 10:5.
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over a year earlier by the Peking and Tientsin Times which had
carried on a consistent campaign against the continuance of the
alliance and had declared that the treaty would not be renewed
in July 1921, but that a laissez faire policy would be adopted.30
By July 1 the Canadian minister had convinced Jan Smuts,
Curzon and Lloyd George of the importance of taking a chance
on American willingness to collaborate on a Pacific agreement.
The Marquess Curzon then surprised the conference by outlining
a procedure for a Pacific conference which would include the
United States as a party to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as pro
posed by Arthur Meighen. This action, according to J. Bartlet
Brebner, represented the first notable occasion of a British
dominion formulating a policy of the empire.31
The proposal was now put to the test. Tokyo was noncom
mittal;32 Washington expressed disapproval of the treaty's re
newal but interest in an agreement on Pacific affairs. As early
as August 1914 the United States had discreetly sounded the
attitude of the belligerents upon the question of maintenance of
the status quo in the Far East and throughout the Pacific gen
erally. Great Britain then found such a suggestion impractical
for she had already launched operations against Germany in the
Pacific.33 Historically, the United States took no exception to
the alliance and only after the World War was it seriously re
garded in Washington as constituting a potential danger to the
country. The United States government, however, made no
authoritative declaration in regard to the treaty. American dis
trust of the alliance centered on its relation to Japanese im
perialism on the continent of Asia rather than on the possibility
that it might involve England in a war with the United States.
The State Department looked upon the treaty as a political
instrument harmful to its policies in Eastern Asia.34
so Peking and Tientsin Times, June 24, 1920; Dennis, op. cit., p. 73.
si Brebner, loc. cit., p. 56.
32 For Japanese opinion toward the renewal of the alliance, see Dennis,
op. cit., pp. 64-68, 91-93; A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of
the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 278, 288, 298; The Times, July 26,
1921, p. 10, “The Pacific—Plain Words from Japan”, and Aug. 16, p. 8,
“Japan Doubts—Public Dislike of Conference”.
33 USDS, Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement, pp. 162, 165-166.
si For the attitude of the United States toward the treaty and its renewal,
see Griswold, op. cit., pp. 275 et seq., and The Times, Sept. 16, 1921, p. 8.
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During the course of the Imperial Conference, on July 21, Mr.
Hughes addressed the American Luncheon Club, and among
other things said that “unless, and until, the Pacific problem is
settled, it is obvious that the prospect of the great naval powers
coming to an agreement on a practicable scheme is remote.”
Therefore, he advocated a preliminary conference or meeting to
discuss Pacific questions at which Australia and New Zealand
should be represented.35
The prime ministers at London neither renewed nor abrogated
the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, but the proposal to hold a Pacific
conference received their unanimous support and was considered
at great length. On July 11, Lord Curzon suggested that a pre
liminary meeting on Pacific and Far Eastern affairs be held in
London during the first part of August. The American Secretary
of State, Charles Evans Hughes, objected because China, Japan
and the United States could not make suitable preparations by
that time, and he felt that postponement of the conference on
the limitation of armaments would create an unfavorable Ameri
can public reaction.36 The Conference of Prime Ministers closed
on August 5 and six days later President Warren G. Harding
issued formal invitations to the Conference on the Limitation of
Armament and Far Eastern Affairs to convene at Washington on
November 1, 1921. Secretary Hughes remained adamant on the
question of a preliminary meeting—even one at Bar Harbor,
Maine—to prepare the agenda on Pacific and Far Eastern affairs,
not because he was unwilling to consult with the dominion pre
miers, but because in his solicitude for the success of the confer
ence he did not wish to have freedom of discussion limited by
any preliminary deliberations on the part of a particular group.37
Prime Minister Hughes, after returning home, reviewed Aus
tralia’s position before and at the Conference of Prime Ministers
in a lengthy speech delivered to the House of Representatives on
September 30. He warned: “If we cannot secure a satisfactory
Treaty, then it is obvious that any adequate scheme of naval
defence will involve us in much greater expenditure, and at a
35 Australia, Parliamentary Debates, vol. XCVII, p. 11639.
36 Secretary Hughes to Ambassador Harvey, July 13, 1921, USDS, Foreign
Relations, 1921, I, 28-29.
37 Harvey to Hughes, July 27, 1921, in ibid., pp. 46-47; Merze Tate, The
United States and Armaments (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), p. 125. See pp.
122-126 on the genesis of the Washington Conference.
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time when our resources are strained to the uttermost/’38 The
prime minister was for an immediate declaration of intention to
renew the alliance upon terms that would at once be compatible
with the League of Nations Covenant, which would give the
United States ample opportunity to be consulted officially, and
which would “exclude specifically, and in set terms, the possi
bility of our being ranged in hostile array against America by
virtue of that Treaty.” That was his position, and he ventured
“to say that a further postponement will, and can, place us in
no better position than we are today.”39
Meanwhile, on August 18, Lloyd George reported to the House
of Commons on the Conference of Prime Ministers. Referring
to the Japanese treaty he said: “The Alliance is an existing
Alliance, and until 12 months’ notice is given that Alliance con
tinues.” He reviewed the operation of the agreement during the
war and asserted that no man could “come to any other con
clusion than that it was loyally and faithfully interpreted and
carried out by our Japanese Allies.”40 Then he asked:
Is it to be suggested that we should now turn round and say to
them, “You stood by us in trouble, but we do not need you any
longer, so goodbye”? Would anyone behave like that in business?
The British Empire must behave like a gentleman, and when you
come to deal with a country that has stood by you in trouble—stood
well by you—are you to bring the alliance to an end when the
trouble is over? I say that would not be becoming of the British
Empire in dealing with a faithful Ally. And let me say this: I do
not believe there is any country in the world, whether it likes the
Japanese Alliance or does not like it, that would think any better of
the British Empire if we broke off the alliance—not one. They
might appear to be glad at the moment that we had done it, but
in their hearts they would despise us for doing it.41

Instead of abrogating the alliance, the prime minister sug
gested a new combination of Britain, Japan and the United
States, emphasizing particularly that the “cardinal principle of
British policy” must be to “act in as complete accord with the
United States of America as any two countries can.” The idea
of such a triple entente was not novel, for it had come up in the
discussions in the Imperial Conference and had been voiced in
38 Australia, Parliamentary Debates, vol. XCVII, p. 11635.
39 Ibid., p. 11636.
40 Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. CXLVI,
col. 1710.
41 Ibid., col. 1711.
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the British press and in the House of Commons. In reporting
Lloyd George’s speech, the Times concluded: “If the Alliance
with Japan could merge in a greater understanding with Japan
and the United States of America in all the problems of the
Pacific that would be a great event which would be a gallant
deed for the peace of the world.”42
Between London and Washington
During the summer and early autumn of 1921 there was a
noticeable change of attitude in the United Kingdom toward the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. A year earlier, in the summer of 1920,
when the Peking and Tientsin Times was predicting nonrenewal
of the agreement,48 the (London) Times correspondent in Tokyo
was reporting that it was taken for granted that the alliance
would be renewed.44 Throughout the winter of 1920-1921 there
was comparatively little in the British press regarding the sub
ject. This was not the case, however, by the following autumn.
Rear Admiral Nathan C. Twining,45 naval attaché to the Ameri
can Embassy in London, reported that the history of the psy
chology of the situation in regard to the alliance was remarkable.
When the treaty first came up for renewal “the whole atmosphere
was apparently calm and clear, no tangible opposition appeared,
and it seemed to be taken as a matter of course, in default of any
better way out, that the Anglo-Japanese treaty would be renewed,
with the understanding that it did not apply in case of trouble
between the United States and Japan.”46
During the Conference of Prime Ministers the British govern
ment had heard strong and plain language from the representa
tives of Canada and New Zealand. In the meantime sentiment
had developed in the United States, and the press generally
expressed the opinion, that renewal of the Anglo-Japanese pact
would be considered a distinctly unfriendly act toward the
United States. Press extracts conveying this idea were taken
42 The Times, Aug. 19, 1921.
42 Peking and Tientsin Times, June 24, 1920.
44 Dennis, op. cit., p. 73.
45 Rear Admiral Nathan Crook Twining, Jr., served as Chief of Staff to
Admiral William S. Sims during World War I. He was the uncle of General
Nathan Farragut Twining, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force in
the first Eisenhower administration and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in the second.
46 Twining to Secretary of the Navy, Oct. 12, 1921, Naval Intelligence File.
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from the American papers and printed throughout the United
Kingdom.
Moreover, three distinguished Britishers came out publicly in
favor of revision, enlargement, or abrogation of the agreement.
As a result of the conference of premiers David Lloyd George
openly and earnestly proposed an Anglo-American-Japanese
triple alliance.47 Although he felt that the arguments in favor
of renewal were stronger than those in favor of denouncing the
alliance, he hoped that the true line of advance lay “not in de
nouncing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, but in transforming it
into a Pacific triple entente, which the combined liberal forces
of Great Britain and America could effectually prevent from ever
becoming aggressive or acquisitive.”48
Lord Northcliffe,49 returning from the antipodes where he had
urged dominion participation in the Washington Conference,
declared in an October 25 interview with a Reuters correspond
ent in Hong Kong his opposition to the treaty. He gave as his
reason that it placed the United States “outside of the very
definite arrangements for the control of China.” For two years
he had been gradually coming to the conclusion that the AngloJapanese Alliance had outrun its usefulness. “Japan faithfully
carried out the compact during the war, and she had been well
rewarded for her services.” The purpose of the Washington Con
ference was to reach a mutual agreement, but the United States
was handicapped by an existing arrangement between Japan and
Great Britain concerning the chief problem of the Pacific. North
cliffe concluded: “A prolongation of the alliance only serves to
irritate public and official opinion in the United States, merely
humiliates China and adds nothing to the prestige of Great
Britain in Asia.”50
Viscount Bryce, who had just returned from a visit to the
United States, contributed to the Times of October 18 an article
47 New York Times, Oct. 14, 1921.
48 Ibid., Oct. 2, 1921, VIII, 4. This opinion was expressed to Professor
C. H. Van Tyne, of the History Department of the University of Michigan,
in a letter written “by a man of international reputation, who now occupies
one of the most important positions in the British Empire.”
49 Alfred Charles William Harmsworth, 1st Viscount Northcliffe, was a
newspaper proprietor who served as chairman of the British War Mission,
1917-1918, director of propaganda in enemy countries, 1918, and of the Civil
Aerial Transport Committee in 1917.
^ N ew York Times, Oct. 27, 1921.
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on the Washington Conference in which he referred to the
American attitude toward the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in these
words:
It has been pointed out over and over again that there is nothing
in that treaty to affect the United States. Nevertheless, nine men
out of ten in the United States continue to repeat that England is
the ally—the exclusive ally—of Japan, and that the effect of the
treaty has been and is to make Japan think she has a comparatively
free hand and may adopt policies of aggression on which she would
otherwise fear to embark.51

Lord Bryce observed that no explanation seemed likely to
remove this impression from the American mind. It remained
even when Englishmen pointed out that their own interests in
securing not only the open door for commerce in China but the
political independence of China were exactly the same as the
interests of the United States. He concluded that there was no
reason whatever for any divergence between the British and
American policy as regards China and the possible action of
Japan there.
Admiral Twining reported that by October the whole situation
so far as the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was concerned had changed
“from one of obvious, inevitable and peaceful procedure leading
to the renewal of that treaty” to one in which the British govern
ment was faced with a tremendous problem which affected “the
internal arrangements of the British Empire and its most impor
tant relations with the United States.” There was a desire in the
United Kingdom that the government should escape in some way
from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The general impression there
was that the United States and Japan would be at war before
many years, and the disturbing question was the position Britain
would occupy in case of such an event. There was no question
as to the sympathy of the English people; “in case of a white
race against a yellow race the English would side with the white
race” and the universal desire of Englishmen and the most press
ing need of England was for “close and most friendly relations
with the United States.”52
From conversations with various people in minor government
positions and in the army and navy, Twining received the clear
si The Times, Oct. 18, 1921.
52 Twining to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Nov. 19, 29, 1921, Naval
Intelligence File.
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impression that a termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
would be distinctly welcome, provided it could be reached with
out any actual or apparent bad faith toward the Japanese. Indi
viduals freely expressed the opinion in private that they disliked
the Japanese and regretted that political necessity had brought
Great Britain into alliance with Japan.
From newspaper articles and from conversations which Twin
ing had with people not in official life, there was also evidence
of a strong sentiment in the country against the continuation of
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; but in November, after the Wash
ington Conference assembled, British opinion was not entirely
certain whether the abrogation of the alliance would be favored
in case of failure of the conference to produce some agreement
or understanding which would in effect accomplish the same
purpose as was supposed to be accomplished by the alliance.
There seemed to be a very general opinion in Great Britain that
the existence of this alliance was a source of irritation to the
United States, and that its abrogation would tend to strengthen
the Anglo-American entente, which was almost universally de
sired.53
In addition to the anxiety over the treaty as a political instru
ment distasteful to the United States, and the feeling that the
agreement had served its purpose, there was dissatisfaction with
the alliance among British mercantile and financial interests
alarmed over the increasing competition of Japanese commerce
in China. They were also concerned that their business relations
with the Chinese might suffer because of Britain’s apparent ap
proval of her ally’s methods. Significant articles by prominent
Englishmen in the Far East voiced these anxieties.54 For instance,
Robert Young, editor of the Japan Chronicle, considered that the
alliance had “failed to preserve the independence of Korea or
strengthen the integrity of China.’’ It had “aroused the deepest
resentment in China and intense suspicion in America.” It was
the cause of much of the ill-feeling that prevailed between China
and Japan. Young concluded:
The militarists of Japan and of Britain, supported by their respec
tive Foreign Offices, favour the Alliance, for it carries out the
unexpressed objects for which it was really framed. But the agree
ment is wholly against the real interests of the British and Japanese
53 Same to same, Nov. 29, 1921, in ibid.
54 Dennis, op. cit., pp. 63-64.
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peoples, which consist in the establishment of good relations and
friendship with all nations.55

Even in Japan there appeared to be an unofficial volte face on
the question of the renewal of the treaty. The correspondent of
the United Press in Tokyo reported that by November the edi
torials and semiofficial comment in the newspapers had suddenly
turned against a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The
substitution of an American, British and Japanese understanding
was being urged as highly desirable.56
The Washington Conference
In Washington the spokesmen of the Pacific dominions, while
claiming to favor the renewal of the alliance, were less deter
mined in their support of it than had been Prime Ministers
Hughes and Massey in London. Now there appeared a willing
ness on the part of the delegates of both countries to search for
a satisfactory tripartite agreement as a substitute for the bilateral
alliance. In a press conference of November 22 Senator George
Foster Pearce57 made clear that even though Australia had
nothing to do with the initiation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,
and the war peril had passed which led her to endorse the treaty
in the council of the empire, held in London in 1911, his govern
ment was in full accord with the rest of the British Empire with
regard to the treaty. He gave a lucid explanation of the circum
stances surrounding the Labour party’s attitude on the subject
of the renewal in 1911, when the party believed that, in the
interest of Australia, the treaty should be renewed. The war
demonstrated that Japan was an honorable ally who faithfully
fulfilled her obligations under the treaty, and “it would not be
fair treatment for us to be the first to say that the treaty shall
now go into the waste basket.’’ He wanted, however, to see the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance renewed in such a form that was com
pletely acceptable to and in no way directed against the United
States. He also stated that the American proposal for a limitacs Robert Young, “The Anglo-Japanese Alliance”, Contemporary Review,
vol. CXX (July 1921), p. 19.
Sydney Morning Herald, Nov. 21, 1921.
57 In the conference documents Pearce is officially designated as “Minister
of Defence”, but in the Times (London), the New York Times, the Sydney
Morning Herald, and the Wellington Evening Post he is always referred to
as Senator Pearce.
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tion of naval armaments, “which was hailed with lively enthusi
asm by the people of the Australian Commonwealth, had mate
rially strengthened the sentiment there in favor of a ‘triple
entente’ in the Far East.’’58
New Zealand stood beside Australia in favoring the continu
ance of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty at least until “a more com
prehensive system’’ for guaranteeing the peace of the Far East
had been devised. Her spokesman, Sir John William Salmond,
was reported as saying:
We see no justification for scrapping that alliance without substi
tuting something for it. Japan gave us faithful and valuable service
in the dangerous time of war and we owe her our gratitude for it.
It is not the English nor the American way to turn our backs on a
friend. If and when some more general agreement can be entered
into for the preservation of the peace of the Pacific, New Zealand
and Australia will welcome it as a substitute for the present imper
fect system.59

In fine, by the time the Washington Conference convened, the
opinion of all the dominion representatives appears to have been
that expressed by General Jan Smuts in the Conference of Prime
Ministers when he stated that South Africa was “opposed to any
exclusive alliances.’’ To him it seemed “clear that the only path
of safety for the British Empire is a path on which she can walk
together with America.’’60 Moreover, the New Zealand delegate
insisted that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not applicable
against the United States, stating that a recent speech of Lloyd
George in the House of Commons expressed sufficiently New
Zealand’s point of view.61
At the Washington Conference the most dramatic achievement
was the Five-Power Treaty to limit quantitatively and qualita
tively capital ship and aircraft carrier construction at a ratio of
5-5-3-1.67-1.62 Japan accepted a position of capital ship inferi
ority in accordance with the 5-5-3 ratio only on condition that
Great Britain and the United States agree not to build new forti
fications in the Pacific during the life of the treaty. Consequently,
ss New York Times, Nov. 23, 1921; Sydney Morning Herald, Nov. 24, 1921.
59 New York Times, Nov. 24, 1921.
G° Conference of Prime Ministers, p. 24.
ci Ibid.
62 U.S. Senate Documents, 67 Cong., 2 Sess., no. 126, Conference on the
lÀmitation of Armament, pp. 252-254, 875-876.
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there was incorporated in this treaty Article XIX, an agreement
to maintain the status quo of certain specified naval bases and
fortifications in the Pacific.63 This article aimed to make the
Pacific truly pacific.
With the menace of attack by one of the Pacific naval Powers
against another removed, the way was prepared for the abroga
tion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The representatives of the
British Empire, Japan, the United States and France entered
into a Four-Power Treaty on December 13, 1921, under the terms
of which the signatories agreed that if there should develop be
tween any of them a controversy arising out of ‘‘any Pacific
question and involving their said rights” which was not satis
factorily settled by diplomacy and was likely to affect their
harmonious accord, they would refer the whole subject to a
joint conference of all the high contracting parties “for consid
eration and adjustment.” If the said rights were threatened by
any other Power, the contracting parties agreed to communicate
with one another “in order to arrive at an understanding as to
the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to
meet the exigencies of the particular situation.”64 The agreement
of ten years’ duration was limited in its application to “insular
possessions and Dominions in the Pacific Ocean,” including the
mandated islands.
This was a four- not a three-Power treaty as originally advo
cated. Secretary Hughes insisted upon bringing France into the
agreement, not only to soothe her somewhat ruffled pride over
the naval ratio of 1.67 vis-à-vis the same for Italy, but undoubt
edly as a deliberate policy of generalizing the responsibilities of
a treaty that might otherwise appear to be a departure from the
traditional American policy of avoiding entangling alliances.
The agreement called merely for consultation, not arbitration,
and even this was limited by a supplementary proviso so as not
“to embrace questions which according to principles of interna
tional law lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the
respective Powers.”65
This mild denatured agreement to refer disputes to consulta
tion met American objections to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
63 Ibid., p. 875.
64 ibid., pp. 102-103, 890.
65 Ibid., p. 892. For a discussion of the Four-Power Treaty, see Tate, op.

rit . np. 126-133.
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and was a cheap price for the United States to pay for the abro
gation of that alliance and a new pledge of respect for the integ
rity of the Philippines. In the words of A. Whitney Griswold:
“It substituted a four-power agreement to talk for a two-power
agreement to fight.“66
The delegates of both Australia and New Zealand were satis
fied, in fact pleased, with the results of the conference. From
Senator Pearce’s point of view the Four-Power Treaty was the
most valuable of the agreements concluded at Washington. Sir
John Salmond felt that the quadruple agreement ensured peace
in the Pacific Ocean for at least ten years. Pearce, in a statement
to the Australian Press Association on February 6, 1922, ob
served: “The Four-Power Pacific pact does not involve any
interference in purely domestic questions, therefore it does not
in any way involve our independence in respect to local ques
tions.“ Referring to the remarkable results achieved at Wash
ington, the statesman concluded that “the success of the Con
ference is beyond the wildest anticipation of the most hopeful,“
and he invited critics in Australia who foretold its failure to
review their criticism.67
At the Washington Conference a Japanese diplomatist is
alleged to have remarked to his British colleague: “At any rate
you gave the Alliance a splendid funeral!“ and the Englishman
is not reported to have disagreed.68
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66 Griswold, op. cit., p. 313.
67 Sydney Morning Herald, Feb. 8, 1922.
68 Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923, published
under the auspices of the British Institute of International Affairs (London,
1925), p. 490. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance actually came to an end on
August 17, 1923, the date on which the ratifications of the Four-Power Treaty
were deposited.

